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Abstract 
I investigate whether vesting budgets with doctors impacts treatment decisions and patients 
outcomes by exploiting the transitional phase of major recent health care reforms in England 
that passed budgets to consortia of General Practitioners (GPs). Applying difference-in-
difference techniques to balanced treatment and control groups, I find that practices 
becoming actively responsible for consortia budgets engaged in cost-saving prescribing and 
referral behaviour but that patients in these practices experienced a relative deterioration in 
the quality of their care. I discuss a number of explanations for these results, including that 
the reforms incentivised doctors to reduce quality in order to save cash or that they simply 
distracted those doctors most closely involved. 
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1 Introduction
In the tax funded English National Health Service the distinction between organisations that
plan and buy (“commissioners”) and those that sell services (“providers”) dates back to the NHS
and Community Care Act of 1990 which first split the functions and in effect created a quasi-
market in the NHS. Commissioners plan, purchase, and performance manage services on behalf
of their resident populations drawing on local health budgets allocated against local population
characteristics.1 Providers constitute a diverse array of primary, secondary, and community
health service providers that contract with one or more commissioners to run facilities and
clinics or otherwise provide health services.
General Practitioners (GPs) play a role on both sides of the NHS market. As private sector
providers, GP practices contract with commissioners to provide primary care services, but they
also perform a gatekeeping role also found in many US health maintenance organization (HMOs)
and in health systems in Continental Europe. The gatekeeper function means a patient’s ability
to access planned tests and treatments at hospitals and other NHS providers can usually only
follow a referral from a GP. As such the GP has a “double” agency role (Ellis and McGuire
1986; Blomqvist 1991), acting for the patient in choosing the clinically most appropriate course
of action, and an agent for commissioners and ultimately the funders of care in allocating scare
resources. A third set of internal agency relationships — analogous to those found in other
markets — is introduced as GPs organise themselves into practices and into wider medical
groups (Gaynor 1994).
Until the Health & Social Care Act 2012 commissioning in the English NHS was performed
by groups of administrators organised into 151 geographically defined Primary Care Trusts
(PCTs). The reforms enacted in 2012 led to the abolition of PCTs and passed commissioning
responsibilities to groups of local GP practices bound together into new statutory bodies called
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs).2 Legislation set out a number of requirements for the
new bodies, including that all practices must join a CCG (which effectively became membership
1Weighted capitation has been used to allocate NHS resources since the 1970s (Department of Health 2011b).
Recent formula include separate components for primary care services, primary care prescribing, and Hospital
and Community Health Services. To give a sense of scale, in 2012 the overall primary care services budget was
approx £8 billion; primary care prescribing approx £8 billion; and for Hospital and Community Health Services
approx £80 billion.
2Through their membership of CCGs, GPs obtained two additional duties under the auspices 2012 Act:
commissioning secondary and community care services for resident populations, and a duty to assist in improving
the quality of primary care.
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organisations for local GP practices), and that CCGs were required to have a governing body
with at least one GP (leading the CCG as either the Accountable Officer or Chair), although
it is clear most CCGs went well beyond this since half of all governing board members are GPs
(Iacobucci 2012).
In making GPs commissioners, policy-makers sought to harness GPs’ expertise and knowledge
of their patients to realise technical and allocative efficiencies, for example in designing services
around local preferences, moving care outside hospitals, and reducing information asymmetry
in contract negotiations with hospitals (Ham 2010; Timmins 2012). They also sought to in-
centivise GPs as gatekeepers to achieve cost efficiencies in their own decisions. Evidence from
GP fundholding in the 1990s suggests that giving GP gatekeepers hard budgets could reduce
referrals (Dusheiko et al. 2006) and prescribing costs (Goodwin 1998), which together account
for roughly a quarter of NHS costs.3 Related evidence for the US also suggests that gatekeepers
in HMOs reduce costs in response to financial incentives (Gaynor et al. 2004).
However, GP fundholding also suggests that GPs may respond to financial incentives in holding
budgets in opportunistic ways for their own financial gain (Croxson et al. 2001), and the evidence
on quality is sparse and inconclusive. Fundholders’ patients benefited from relatively shorter
waiting times (Dusheiko et al. 2004; Propper et al. 2002), but cross-sectional evidence suggests
that they were less satisfied overall and particularly with accessibility of services (Dusheiko et
al. 2007). Perhaps with this in mind, architects of the 2012 reforms focused on providing CCG
level group incentives that bite on both cost and quality performance and introduced a range
of other safeguards.4 Nevertheless, concerns that GPs could manipulate new powers for their
own ends were raised throughout the legislative process, and resurfaced with recent evidence
that CCGs have awarded contracts worth £2.4 billion to organisations in which governing body
GPs have a financial interest (Iacobucci 2015).
Despite potential to address important research questions (e.g. about the role of incentives and
the tension between agency relationships in health care), to date academics have offered little
analysis of the reforms. This paper aims to fill this void by providing some initial quantitative
insights into effects of the commissioning reforms on practice level outcomes that indicate cost
3There are some important differences with the more recent reforms e.g. GPs volunteered to become fund-
holders, they held individual budgets and could negotiate prices with hospitals. Under current arrangements,
primary care drugs and most hospital treatment prices are set nationally implying that volumes are central to
containing costs, budgets are group based and participation is mandatory for all practices.
4These incentive schemes are outlined below. Note that the reforms left the remuneration system and incentive
structures faced by individual practices as providers of primary care essentially unchanged.
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saving behavior and quality of care. Identification is challenging both because GPs took on
commissioning within a wider set of reforms and because all GPs legally became commissioners
st the same time. I focus on the transitional phase of the reforms, after they were announced but
before they became fully operational on 1 April 2013. This helps to disentangle commissioning
changes from other elements of the reforms since during this time GPs were taking up new
duties but other changes had yet to take hold, but at the cost that only short-term effects can
be estimated. These are not necessarily informative about longer term impacts of the reforms;
an important caveat to findings.
To estimate effects, I exploit that some GPs actively participated in fulfilling new commissioning
duties during the transition by becoming members of CCG governing bodies. Estimates are
based on comparing changes in outcomes for these practices against a control group using
difference-in-difference techniques. This method relies on an assumption of parallel trends, in
this case that outcomes in practices with governing body GPs would have evolved in an identical
manner to my control group absent the reforms. Mindful of the threats to identification due
to self-selection onto governing bodies, I examine pre-reform trends in outcomes at practices
which host governing body GPs and those that do not, allowing me to isolate outcomes where
the assumption plausibly holds. Further, I construct a control group made up of practices who
hosted a governing body GP outside the treatment window, demonstrating these practices are
well matched on pre-reform characteristics. The estimation strategy implies a further important
caveat to findings since I can only estimate differential impacts - to the extent that all practices
changed behaviour during the reforms, I underestimate effects.5
Using these techniques, results suggest that practices taking on budget responsibilities during
the transition engaged in more cost saving behaviour but also that their patients suffered from
deteriorating care relative to control groups. These findings are robust to controlling for a
range of practice and patient characteristics and unobserved factors. The most consistent set
of results is on prescribing imply spending on drugs per patient fell by between 0.6 and 1.2 %
relative to other practices. Results also suggest that these practices reduced the proportion of
patients who were referred to secondary care but then discharged at the first appointment by 1%.
While results are imprecisely estimated for quality, they are consistent across specifications and
suggest that the proportion of patients admitted to hospitals with conditions that could have
been treated in primary care rose by between 1.3 and 3%. In the final section I discuss possible
5Estimating long term effects would require data which is not currently available to this researcher. Estimating
overall effects of the reforms would require a different identification strategy.
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mechanisms that could account for these results, including the effects of financial incentives,
the salience of allocative efficiency issues, or the distraction of doctors from patient care.
2 The 2012 Act and Commissioning Reforms
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 introduced major structural changes in the NHS, and
were described by then NHS Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson as being so big that “you
could probably see them from space”. Summaries consistently place commissioning reform top
of the changes introduced by the Act (see for example Ham et al. (2015)) although the reforms
actually constitute a much wider set of changes. The Nuffield Trust describe these as: (a) giving
groups of GP practices and other professionals ’real’ budgets to buy care on behalf of their local
communities; (b) shifting many of the responsibilities historically located in the Department
of Health to NHS England, a new, politically independent body; (c) the creation of a health
specific economic regulator with a mandate to guard against anti-competitive practices; and
(d) the intention to move all NHS hospital Trusts to foundation trust status (semi-autonomous
organisational similar to mutual organisations).6
Figure 1 sets out a timeline of the reforms, with some key milestones along the top of the arrow.
The May 2010 election that led to a hung parliament and the formation of the Conservative and
Liberal Democrat coalition is taken to constitute the start of the reform period.7 Key reform
principles were set out in a White Paper in July 2010 and an implementation plan in December
2010 (Department of Health 2010a; Department of Health 2010b). After a lengthy legislative
process, including a pause to conduct an extended consultation, the Health and Social Care
Act was enacted in March 2012. The majority of changes set out in the legislation formally
began on 1 April 2013, including formal transfer of commissioning responsibilities to CCGs,
full establishment of the new economic regulator, the new executive agency NHS England, and
Public Health England (a new body for public health).
6This is adapted from the summary of the reforms on the Nuffield Trust website: <http://www.
nuffieldtrust.org.uk/our-work/projects/coalition-governments-health-and-social-care-reforms>
7Timmins (2012) provides a lively account of the origins of the reform legislation. During their time in
opposition the Conservative party, led by shadow Health Secretary Andrew Lansley, had formulated plans for
GP commissioning and revealed the core ideas before the election (see for example Timmins (2012) page 22-25,
and the Conservative “White paper” in June 2007 (Conservative Party 2007)). However, the scale and detail of
the reforms were not widely understood. For example, the idea that all GP practices might be required to be
involved in commissioning was mooted out in August 2009, although Lansley states this was only finally decided
“in late May or early June” 2010 (Timmins (2012) pages 33).
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Figure 1: Commissioning Reform Transition
Despite this, the evidence suggests that many GPs were actively involved in commissioning well
before 1 April 2013. This stands in contrast to the changes to the provider side of the market
which have been slow to take hold. The captions underneath the arrow in figure 1 highlight the
evolution of GP commissioning groups during the transition. Invitations to become pathfinder
GP commissioning groups (initially known as GP consortia) were issued in October 2010. These
developed rapdily such that half the population was covered by a GP consortia by February
2011, 88% by April 2011 (Department of Health 2011a), and 97% by July 2011.8 Pathfinder
consortia had evolved to 211 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) by 2013. All CCGs were
subjected to an authorisation process in the latter stages of the transition with the first of the
4 authorisation waves taking place in October 2012.
While not fully responsible for commissioning services until April 2013, CCGs were acting
as shadow commissioners during the transition, taking over from the outgoing commissioning
bodies, PCTs, which were rationalised into clusters from June 2011 and then abolished in April
2013.9 CCGs began to take on legally delegated authority for commissioning and associated
budgets from Primary Care Trusts as early as January 2011 (Department of Health 2010c)
and by November 2011 held half of commissioning budgets (Department of Health 2011c).
During this time, CCGs were expected to be involved in contract negotiations with hospitals
and other providers, and to be taking on responsibility for delivering savings under QIPP,
a national efficiency programme (for example through prescribing and referral management
schemes) (Department of Health 2010c). More than half of GPs surveyed in July 2011 stated
their consortia had factored in QIPP savings into plans for 2011/12 “a great deal” or “a fair
amount” (KPMG/IpsosMori 2011). By March 2012 CCGs had been allocated full shadow
budgets, were “increasingly taking on day-to-day commissioning responsibilities”, held 59% of
8Guardian article “Time for the NHS to act after pause, says Andrew Lansley”’ 8 July 2011 <http://www.
theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2011/jul/08/time-for-nhs-to-act-after-pause-andrew-lansley>.
The sixth and final wave of pathfinder organisations was announced in October 2011.
9Despite this, funding for services continued to be allocated to PCT throughout the transition.
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commissioning budgets, and were preparing to take full responsibility for the 2013/14 planning
round (NHS England 2012).
Although all practices became part of a CCG, around a sixth of practices were actively par-
ticipating in commissioning through one of their GPs holding a position on the CCG Board
governing body. Governing bodies could be formed with lay members and clinicians with some
flexibility, although guidance required a practicing GP to hold at least one of the two main
leadership roles of Accountable Officer or Chair. Leaders could be elected or appointed, but
had to demonstrate support from members of the CCG.10 While difficult to establish precisely
when individual GPs joined governing bodies, GPs were already moving into shadow consortia
by December 2010 (Department of Health 2010c) and by early 2012, 645 GPs held positions
on 100 CCGs providing information, suggesting an average of between 6 and 7 GPs per CCG
(Iacobucci 2012). In many cases it appears GPs were appointed to positions in early to mid
2011, a finding consistent with 38% of GPs surveyed in July 2011 stating they were personally
involved in commissioning “a great deal” or “a fair amount” (KPMG/IpsosMori 2011).11
2.1 GP incentives under the 2012 reforms
Making GPs commissioners and giving them budgets gives rise to potential conflicts of interests
because GPs can both “make” and — as part of a CCG — “buy” services. Outside of their
practices many GPs also run additional community and primary care services (for example out
of hours GP services) but as commissioners in CCGs, GPs also award and manage contracts.
The implication is that under the new commissioning arrangements, GPs could award contract
for services to themselves (for example see Smith et al. (2010)). A related concern was that
conflicts of interest could arise if GPs could profit from reducing the quality or quantity of care
for their patients below an efficient level, for example prescribing less or making fewer referrals
to hospitals in their gatekeeper role. This would free up funds for the CCG; if these could be
distributed to GPs or invested in new services run by GPs, then GPs might benefit by reducing
care quantity or quality. Moreover, since commissioning budgets are large compared to other
services – a 1% surplus in these budgets is roughly 8% of primary care budget – savings would
10Legislation and guidance covers a number of governance arrangements including a constitution, register of
interests and governing body (NHS Commissioning Board 2012b; NHS Commissioning Board 2012a).
11In Stoke for example, the GP chair and six GP leads were appointed in January 2011. See <http://
www.gponline.com/consortia-stoke-on-trent-gps-progress/article/1068733>. I discuss how I deal with
uncertainty over timing of GP participation in commissioning in the empirical section.
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lead to scope for substantial gains.12
The reforms sought a balance between encouraging GPs to engage in cost saving and quality
enhancing activity while safeguarding against such opportunistic behaviour. Although CCGs
would (largely) control how savings on commissioning budgets could be spent, they could not
simply be distributed to practices but had to be reinvested in services. Guidance ensures that
individuals commencing a position on a CCG governing body must declare relevant financial
interests, e.g. holding shares in a company providing health care, and must leave board discus-
sions relating to these interests.13 To protect quality, a quality bonus (up to £5 per patient,
roughly 3.5% of the GP budget) can be distributed to practices for improving services if the
CCG meets quality targets across specified domains, albeit is only achieved if the CCG is in
financial surplus. Critically for this research, although the quality bonus did not begin until
2013, announcements in late 2010 indicated CCGs would inherit legacy financial position of
PCTs accumulated in 2011/12 & 2012/13 (Department of Health 2010c). CCGs could draw
down any surpluses from this period after 1 April 2013, giving them incentives to make savings
during the transition.
Aside from these changes, important features of the primary care market remain unaltered.
Patients still choose a single local practice at which to register, accessing (publicly funded)
health care services is through a consultation with a GP or via emergency care services. GP
gatekeepers continue to organise themselves into private practices competing with other local
practices for patients, and continue to be paid according to the characteristics of their registered
population, retaining any surpluses after incurring costs for patient care. Capitation means
that the level of referrals and prescribing does not affect individual practice profits directly.
In secondary care, prices for hospital treatments continue to be nationally fixed so that GPs
(and CCGs) margins of adjustment are on reducing volumes, and the reforms coincided with
no major changes in hospitals e.g. closures or new openings.
12See for example the Channel 4 story on 2 March 2011 <http://www.channel4.com/news/
leaked-document-shows-how-doctors-can-profit-from-nhs-reform>.
13Additional safeguards included not passing full responsibility for primary care commissioning to CCGs (these
remained with the central body NHS England, although are now being passed to CCG), statutory duties for
CCGs regarding patient care, oversight by central bodies, including a body with a specific remit to prevent
anti-competitive behaviour.
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3 Empirical Analysis
Evaluating the quantitative impacts of the reforms is complicated by a number of factors, not
least that all GPs became obliged to participate in commissioning services, and because a
range of other system changes were made alongside commissioning reforms. I circumvent these
problem as far as I am able by focusing on the transitional phase of the reforms and by exploiting
variation in the degree to which GPs participated with the new commissioning responsibilities.
Specifically, my empirical strategy centres on practice level difference-in-difference regression
analysis comparing changes in outcomes in practices most strongly associated with the com-
missioning reforms (the “treatment”) before and after the initiation of the reforms (the “policy
off/on” periods) relative to changes in the outcomes in a control group of practices. The treat-
ment and outcome measures and strategies for construction of control groups are described
further below. Based on the information captured in Figure 1, for the quantitative analysis
I take the May 2010 election that resulted in a hung parliament to be the end of the control
period. The tightness of the election and the fact that plans for health reform were not well
understood make it unlikely that GP would have taken any actions in anticipation of the reforms
prior to this point. Although the reform legislation was not enacted until March 2012, I use
April 2011 as the start of the policy on period. By this point the vast majority of consortia had
been formed, many GPs were actively involved in new commissioning duties, and had incentives
to make cost savings. To mitigate risk from potential confounders, I use the narrowest window
possible, using financial year 2009/10 as my control period, and financial years 2011/12-2012/13
as the policy on period.
3.1 Treatment and Outcome measures
Since all GP practices joined a CCG on 1 April 2013, I rely on a treatment intensity indicator
that captures the degree to which practices actively participated in commissioning duties during
the transition. Specifically, I separate GP practices into three groups based on the participation
of individual GPs on CCG governing bodies during and after the transition. Allocation of
practices into groups rests on a database that combines information about CCG governing body
membership (obtained under Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, CCG Board documents,
and local press reports) with GP employment histories since 1 April 2009 obtained from the
NHS Information Centre. Since CCGs were unable to provide data on the dates GPs started on
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governing bodies if these were before 1 April 2013, I make the assumption that governing body
GPs had begun by 1 April 2011, an assumption supported by the evidence described above.14
Full details of the construction of the underlying database are described in the Appendix.
The first group — which I call Gov. Body — is composed of 1151 practices where at least
one GP held a position on the CCG governing body during the transition. To be in this group,
I require a governing body GP to be at the practice throughout the whole of the treatment
period, i.e. the GP must remain at the practice and on the Governing body up to 1 April 2013.
A Selected Control group contains two subsets of practices: 140 where a resident GP joined
a governing body but only after 1 April 2013; and a smaller subset of 21 that hosted a governing
body GP throughout the control period but not the transition i.e. a governing body GP was
at the practice during 2009/10 but left prior to 1 April 2011. The third group — All Other
— is an unrestricted control group composed of all practices not included in the Gov. Body
group. Note, however, that I drop 227 practices from the analysis altogether, either because a
GP practices in a different CCG to where they act as a Board member (5 practices), because the
GP was at the practice or governing body for only part of the treatment period (109 practices),
or because the practice moved to a different postcode sector during the period (113 practices).
Outcome measures were chosen to represent practice level outcomes over which GPs can exert
some degree of control through patient care decisions and that exhibit substantial unexplained
variation across practices. My main cost-saving measures are based on prescription costs and
referral to secondary care which collectively account for a large proportion of health spending
(around £25 billion p.a., roughly a quarter of the NHS budget). My principal quality measures
are the rate at which patients are admitted to hospital in an emergency with conditions that
are avoidable with good primary care, and patient experience measures generated from the GP
patient survey. I use other emergency admissions (that is admissions which are not avoidable
however good the primary care), and inpatient waiting times as placebo quality outcomes since
these should in theory not change under the commissioning reforms.
Prescribing costs reflect GP decisions about who should receive medication and the type of
medication to prescribe. Many studies point to substantial clinically unwarranted variation in
practice prescribing. For example the National Audit Office reported in 2007 that £200 million
could be saved on prescribing costs each year without compromising patient care (National
Audit Office 2007). Further, several national and local initiatives have attempted to monitor
14Note that if GPs started later than this results would be attenuated.
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prescribing and drive up prescribing productivity without compromising patient care e.g. the
Better Care, Better Value indicators of the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement,
PCTs and CCG-led prescribing schemes. Prescription costs per patient are generated from
practice level prescribing data from the HSCIC Information Centre and are calculated as the
total cost of items prescribed divided by patient counts, where the numerator is the net in-
gredient costs of all medicines, dressing and appliances excluding any discounts and container
costs.
A second set of cost saving outcomes centre on GP referrals to secondary care. A recent report
(Imison and Naylor 2010) found that GPs make around 9 million referrals each year at a cost of
roughly £15 billion with evidence of very considerable (up to ten-fold) variations between GPs
and between GP practices. The authors conclude that, “The available evidence suggests that
not all referrals are necessary in clinical terms, and a substantial element of referral activity is
discretionary and avoidable.” They go on to describe a variety of NHS referral management
initiatives that have been put in place in a bid to control the cost and efficiency of GP referrals
- from clinical guidelines and financial incentives to more drastic measures such as referral
management centres that audit all referrals and can reject those deemed to be inappropriate. I
use two variables based on referrals in the empirical work. The first is the rate at which patients
are referred to hospitals, which is generated at the practice level using data for first outpatient
attendances recorded in the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) database, counting only referrals
from GPs matching a practice code in my dataset. The second is the proportion of first hospital
outpatient attendances that resulted in the patient being discharged. There is evidence that
some CCGs use this metric to audit or benchmark practices with a view to reducing costs on the
basis that it may capture inappropriate referrals.15 It follows that a reduction in this measure
could indicate an increased focus on making cost reductions in referrals.
My main indicator of quality and patient outcomes is based on the rate of potentially avoidable
hospitalisations (PAH).16 Since the 1990s, avoidable hosptialsations have been interpreted as
measuring aspects of primary care including overall system performance (e.g. Thygesen et al.
(2015), OECD (2012)); quality of diagnosis and chronic disease management (e.g. Starfield et al.
15Board documents from Hull CCG, Stafford and Surrounds CCG,Western Cheshire CCG, Warrington CCG,
and West Kent CCG.
16Throughout this paper I refer to such admissions as avoidable hospitalisations. Terminology varies. The
conditions are sometimes collectively known as Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs), with result-
ing admissions being variously described as potentially avoidable hospitalisations, preventable admissions, or
admissions for avoidable hospital conditions (AHCs).
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(2005)), continuity of care (e.g. Cheng et al. (2010), Nyweide et al. (2013)), or the accessibility
of primary care (e.g. Basu and Friedman (2001), Rosano et al. (2013), Weissman et al. (1992)).
I build on a recent study, Harrison et al. (2014), that uses this outcome measure in a study of
physician incentives in an NHS context.
The idea behind this quality measure is that admitting patients with some presenting conditions
to a hospital setting could have been avoided by appropriate primary care, either by preventing
the onset of avoidable disease (e.g vaccine-preventable conditions), managing an acute illness
(e.g. dehydration), or managing a chronic condition effectively (e.g. diabetes) (Busby et al.
2015). Although in come cases, the admission may not reflect a failure on behalf of a primary
care – for example the patient may have chosen not to visit her GP – variation over time
at the same practice, controlling for patient characteristics should capture some aspects of
quality.17 With no universal definition of which hospital admissions are avoidable I follow
Purdy et al. (2009) using ICD-10 codes for a set of 19 presenting conditions (using the wider
set of diagnosis codes these authors describe). I generate practice level counts of avoidable and
unavoidable emergency admissions, first dropping duplicate records from the HES data and
excluding transfers before collapsing the data to practice level.18
3.2 Control groups
Given that I use a difference-in-difference approaches to estimate effects of the reforms, it is
critical that outcomes in the treatment group of practices should be expected to evolve in a way
that is identical to the control group, however defined, in the absence of treatment. However,
because GPs self-select onto CCG governing bodies, it may be that either the governing body
GPs and/or the practices at which they operate could be systematically different to other
practices – for example, GPs could have different levels or skills, experience or have different
practice styles, and their practices could cater for a different mix of patients. In this section, I
17Weissman et al. (1992) state that “... some hospital admissions, such as those for immunizable conditions,
are almost always avoidable. Even a single case may be cause for concern. However, for most AHCs, being
avoidable is a matter of degree. Because treatment of patients with chronic conditions such as asthma or congestive
heart failure is complex, monitoring AHCs may be most useful when their rates deviate substantially from some
prescribed norm.”
18Ansari et al. (2012) provide a slightly different way to define ACSCs on the basis of ICD-10 diagnosis codes of
admitted patients. I prefer the Purdy et al. (2009) definition for this analysis as it is derived from NHS practices.
The full set of ICD-10 codes is in the Appendix. Note that I do not count avoidable admissions for dental
problems as in the NHS these are not the responsibility of GPs. In generating measures, I retain emergency
admissions by keeping HES data records with admimeth codes 21: via A&E; 22: via GP; 23 via Bed Bureau; 24:
via OP clinic; and then drop transfers which I define as those with admisorc code 51,52 or 53.
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assess the validity of the two control groups of practices described above – the unrestricted set
(All Other) and the restricted set (Select Control) – by comparing pre-treatment trends
in outcomes and examining pre-treatment characteristics across the three groups.
I begin with visual inspection of trends before and after the announcement of the reform, shown
in Figures 2-4. In all plots the x-axis records the time while the y-axis shows the monthly
evolution in the outcome variable for two distinct groups of practices: those where at least one
GP held a position on the governing body of the local commissioning group (dashed blue line)
during the transition and those with no GP representative on the local Board. To construct
indicators, outcomes are first normalised by practice list size for each practice-month and then
collapsed over the two groups weighting by list size, before re-basing so that April 2008 is equal
to one.19
Each figure contains four plots: the top left quadrant shows the raw quarterly average for
reference while the other three quadrants smooth the data separately on either side of April
2010 which is the last month before the Coalition government took office. The top right quadrant
uses a locally weighted regression (Lowess) using a bandwidth of 80% of the observations on
either side of the break, while the bottom quadrants smooth the data using local polynomials
of degree 0 (bottom left) and degree 2 (bottom right). For both polynomials, an Epanechnikov
kernal function is used and the bandwidths (displayed under the Figure), selected automatically
by STATA’s rule of thumb bandwidth estimator, lie between 5 and 7.5 months.
Figure 2 maps out the progression of prescription costs per patient for treated and non-treated
GP practices. All plots within this figure suggest that both sets of practices followed highly
similar trends prior to the formation of the coalition. It is difficult to distinguish a pattern in
the raw data, but when looking at the smoothed data, a slight gap between the groups appears
following the announcement of the reforms appears then appears to close, at least in part, by the
end of 2012/13. The pattern suggests that the treated practices reduced relative prescription
costs per patients initially although perhaps only on a temporary basis.
Figure 3 charts the progression of avoidable hospitalisations per patient for treated and non-
treated GP practices. All plots within this figure again suggest that all practices were on highly
similar trends prior to the formation of the coalition. A more clear divergence in trends appears
for this variable following the announcement of the reforms. The pattern suggests that the a
19For these figures, I use only those practices which have data in each and every month to avoid outcomes
being skewed by attrition and new joiners.
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Figure 2: Drug Expenditure per patient
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greater proportion of patients at treated practices were avoidable admitted to hospital following
the reforms and that this increases over time.
Figure 4 charts the progression of referral per patient for treated and non-treated GP practices.
In contrast to previous figures, all plots within this figure suggest that treated and non-treated
practices were on diverging trends prior to the formation of the coalition: the referral rate in the
treated practices was increasing at a materially faster rate than in other practices.20 While there
is some suggestion that this phenomenon reverses following the commencement of the reforms,
it highlights that application of difference-in-difference techniques using an unrestricted control
group may be problematic because post reform outcomes for non-treated practices will not
necessarily provide a good counterfactual for the treated group of practices.
Table 1 reports mean pre-transition practice level characteristics (for 2009/10) for three groups
of practices. The third and sixth columns report difference in mean tests to assess whether
the treatment group differ along observable dimensions to the potential control groups. Results
20The sharp fall towards the end of 2012/13 may be explained at least in part by data recording - the HES
data provides only finished hospital episodes so that data to 31 March 2013 will exclude any episodes started
before this data but where treatment has not finished. I intend to re-examine this issue when further HES data
is made available to me.
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Figure 3: Avoidable Hospitalisations per patient
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Figure 4: Referrals per patient
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Table 1: Balancing Pre-Transition Practice Characteristics
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Variable Gov Body All Other (1)-(2) Gov Body Select Control (4)-(5)
Observations 1151 6185 1151 161
Patient count 9,402.01 6,499.81 -2,902.20∗∗∗ 9,402.01 9,543.63 141.62
GP count 6.14 4.19 -1.95∗∗∗ 6.14 6.50 0.37
% Aged 65+ 15.78 15.36 -0.42∗ 15.78 16.06 0.28
% Ethn. White 0.88 0.85 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.88 0.90 0.02
% Unemployed 0.04 0.05 0.01∗∗∗ 0.04 0.04 -0.00
% Male 0.42 0.43 0.01∗∗∗ 0.42 0.42 -0.00
% CHD 3.51 3.46 -0.05 3.51 3.56 0.05
% Stroke or TIA 1.71 1.60 -0.11∗∗∗ 1.71 1.77 0.06
% Hypertension 13.24 13.24 0.00 13.24 13.54 0.31
% Diabetes 4.13 4.20 0.07∗ 4.13 4.01 -0.12
% COPD 1.58 1.57 -0.01 1.58 1.57 -0.01
% Epilepsy 0.61 0.59 -0.01∗ 0.61 0.60 -0.01
% Hypothyroidism 2.86 2.80 -0.06∗ 2.86 2.88 0.01
% Cancer 1.30 1.23 -0.07∗∗∗ 1.30 1.36 0.06
% Mental Health 0.76 0.77 0.01 0.76 0.75 -0.01
% Heart Failure 0.75 0.72 -0.03∗∗ 0.75 0.77 0.02
% Palliative 0.11 0.11 -0.01∗ 0.11 0.11 -0.00
% Dementia 0.46 0.42 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.46 0.47 0.01
% Kidney Disease 3.36 3.10 -0.26∗∗∗ 3.36 3.48 0.12
% Atrial Fibr. 1.39 1.28 -0.10∗∗∗ 1.39 1.43 0.04
% Obesity 8.17 8.47 0.30∗∗ 8.17 8.28 0.11
% Learning Diff. 0.31 0.30 -0.01 0.31 0.31 -0.00
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the practice level. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Based on a balanced
panel of practices with data for quarters in 2009/10, 2011/12 and 2012/13; Practices with less than 1000 patients,
moving postcode district, and with a governing body GP for part of the treatment period have been dropped.
highlight significant differences between governing body practices and the unrestricted control
group: governing body practices are considerably larger, having on average 2 more GPs and
3,000 more patients, and have a greater share of white, and a marginally smaller share of male
and unemployed patients. There are also several significant differences in the proportions of
patients with specific health conditions which suggest that governing body practices have sicker
patients. In contrast, the restricted control group of practices appear well matched to the treated
group, with no significant differences along all the observed dimensions. These similarities in
observed pre-transition characteristics suggest this latter subset of practices may provide a good
control group.
Table 2 evaluates whether there are significant differences in trends in the outcomes in governing
body practices and the restricted control groups in the pre-reform period (quarters in 2009/10)
by regressions using a sample including only these two groups. I proceed by regressing each of
the outcome variables described above in turn on a time trend and a time trend interacted with
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Table 2: Pre-Treatment Trends, Governing Body and Select Control groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prescribing Referral Referred but PAH rate Other NE Avg. inpatient
cost pp rate discharged % rate Wait
trend 0.0053∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ 0.1815 0.0380∗∗∗ -0.0017 0.0279∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0118) (0.1969) (0.0073) (0.0049) (0.0036)
Gov.Body × trend 0.0004 0.0218∗ -0.1141 0.0077 0.0000 -0.0015
(0.0018) (0.0121) (0.2058) (0.0078) (0.0052) (0.0038)
Practice FX X X X X X X
Observations 5248 5248 5248 5248 5248 5248
R-squared 0.977 0.935 0.902 0.933 0.904 0.791
trend 0.0038∗ -0.0365∗∗∗ 0.2059 0.0418∗∗∗ -0.0099∗ 0.0286∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0117) (0.2134) (0.0092) (0.0060) (0.0043)
Gov.Body × trend 0.0006 0.0227∗ -0.1140 0.0083 0.0012 -0.0012
(0.0018) (0.0121) (0.2058) (0.0078) (0.0050) (0.0038)
Practice FX X X X X X X
Additional controls X X X X X X
Observations 5248 5248 5248 5248 5248 5248
R-squared 0.978 0.936 0.913 0.933 0.905 0.793
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the practice level. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Additional controls
are GPs per 1000 patients, share patients aged 65 + and proportions of patients registered as having each of 16
health conditions.
an indicator for Gov.Body, including only practice fixed effects in the top panel and adding
patient and practice controls in the lower panel. The interaction term indicates whether there
are significant difference in pre-treatment trends conditional on the controls included. None
of the coefficients are significant, again with the exception of the referral rate where the trend
is significantly less negative in the group of practices which became represented on governing
bodies during the transition. This provides further support for the use of this control group.
3.3 Model specification
I adopt a standard practice level difference in difference approach, exploiting the panel dimension
of the data (Baum-Snow and Ferreira 2014):
ypt = β.GBp.post+ γ
′.controlspt + φp + φt + pt
Where the dependent variable ypt is the natural log of outcome variable y at GP practice p in
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quarter t. The treatment variable GBp is an indicator variable denoting GP practice partici-
pation in new commissioning responsibilities, which is proxied by governing body membership
during the transition as described above. This is interacted with a dummy variable post that
takes the value of 1 for quarters from 2011/12 onwards but is zero otherwise. All regressions
include GP practice fixed effects φp to remove time invariant unobservable factors, and quarter
dummies φt. With this strategy the separate elements GBp and post are subsumed within these
fixed effects so do not appear in the estimated equation. The coefficient on the interaction β
is the difference in difference coefficient denoting the average changes in outcomes during the
transition for practices represented on a CCG governing body relative to the control group of
practices. I run regressions of this form on two sets of specifications distinguishable by practices
constituting the control group. In the first the control group is made up of all practices, while
in the second it is restricted to practices that host a governing body GP but only at a time
outside the treatment window.
Note that using the deviations from mean estimator should help with uncertainty over timing of
effects, arising either because GP behavioural responses to new commissioning responsibilities
may take time or because any GPs actually joined governing bodies later than I assume. Any
inaccuracies in this regard will however attenuate results. This strategy also implies that I elim-
inate time invariant practice unobservables from the estimation. This is potentially important
since research suggests time-invariant physician factors (e.g. practice style, heterogeneous pref-
erences, gender etc) are important factors in explaining variation in treatments patients receive
(Liu and Ma 2013). Including quarter fixed effects eliminates national time trends in outcomes
and should also partial out other national effects that may arise e.g. due to other aspects of the
reforms.
It remains possible that unobserved factors correlated with GPs decisions to join governing
bodies could affect outcomes. To assess this I include a range of time varying controls and fixed
effects in supplementary specifications beyond the minimal one described above. Patient and
practice characteristics are captured by the number of GPs per 1000 patients at the practice;
and the proportions of patients registered as having each of 16 health conditions (e.g. CHD,
Hypertension, Diabetes, COPD, Dementia, Obesity, Mental Health) which are interpolated
from annual data. To account for further unobserved heterogeneity, for example changes in
socio-economic conditions, the funding environment, and locally-led healthcare policies (e.g.
availability of services), I interact region, PCT, and/or CCG dummies with quarter fixed effects.
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These additional specification help to evaluate the extent to which threats to identification, for
example patient sorting between practices in response to changes in GP behaviour, may be
driving results.
4 Results
Results are based on a balanced panel of GP practices for quarters in financial years 2009/10,
2011/12 and 2013/14. As noted above, sample restrictions include dropping practices which
have a GP on a governing body in a different CCG, that had a GP on a governing body for
part of the treatment period, and practices that moved to a different postcode district during
the sample period. I also drop a small number of practices with less than 1000 patients such
that I restrict attention to a total of 7,236 practices in England. Table 3 presents summary
statistics for the three outcome and control variables. The outcome variables presented in this
table are normalised by counts of patients at practices in each quarter (in the regressions I take
the natural log of these values). The table shows that on average there is one GP per every 1400
patients at the practices in my sample period, and around 15% of patients are of retirement
age. The most common health conditions patients are registered for are Hypertension, Obesity,
and Diabetes; the least common (with a mean practice value of less than 1%) are Palliative
care, Dementia, Epilepsy, Learning Difficulties, and Mental Health.
4.1 Unrestricted Control Group
This section reports results from using a difference-in-difference approach using the relatively
unrestricted control group represented by the practices in the All Other group. The uncondi-
tional graphical evidence above is consistent with parallel pre-treatment trends for prescription
cost per patient and the avoidable hospitalisation rate but not for the referral rate. On the basis
of these trends, Table 4 reports results only for the first two outcomes: prescription costs per
patient in columns (1)-(4) and the avoidable hospitalisation rate in (5)-(8). For each outcome
the first column reports findings using only practice fixed effects and quarter dummies. Each
subsequent columns progressively adds to this a minimal set of controls: in the second column
I add region-quarter effects (which also correspond to Strategic Health Authorities which are
coterminous), in the third I add GPs per 1000 patients and patient controls, and in the final
column I introduce PCT-quarter and CCG-quarter effects. As with all subsequent regressions,
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
count mean sd min max
Prescribing cost per patient 88032 37.69 9.37 0.89 259.47
Referrals per 1000 patients 88032 50.72 20.84 0.31 201.78
% of referrals discharged at 1st appointment 88032 28.79 10.45 0.00 100.00
Avoidable Hospitalisation per 1000 patients 88032 5.85 2.41 0.09 36.40
Other emergency admissions per 1000 patients 88032 15.84 4.95 0.89 93.95
Average inpatient waiting time (days) 88032 43.67 7.76 0.00 122.02
GPs/1000 patients 88032 0.69 0.30 0.09 7.33
% Aged 65+ 88032 15.93 5.71 0.00 48.12
% CHD 88032 3.43 1.17 0.00 10.19
% Stroke or TIA 88032 1.67 0.64 0.00 6.45
% Hypertension 88032 13.62 3.48 0.06 37.52
% Diabetes 88032 4.54 1.24 0.00 15.06
% COPD 88032 1.67 0.84 0.00 8.16
% Epilepsy 88032 0.61 0.21 0.05 3.85
% Hypothyroidism 88032 2.99 0.97 0.06 8.24
% Cancer 88032 1.53 0.63 0.00 5.32
% Mental Health 88032 0.81 0.39 0.00 11.90
% Heart Failure 88032 0.72 0.32 0.00 3.89
% Palliative 88032 0.17 0.18 0.00 3.37
% Dementia 88032 0.47 0.35 0.00 9.38
% Kidney Disease 88032 3.28 1.74 0.00 18.11
% Atrial Fibr. 88032 1.38 0.61 0.00 5.20
% Obesity 88032 8.80 3.00 0.35 41.54
% Learning Diff. 88032 0.34 0.24 0.00 5.11
Notes: Based on a balanced panel of practices with data for quarters in 2009/10, 2011/12 and 2012/13; Practices
with less than 1000 patients, moving postcode district, and with a governing body GP for part of the treatment
period have been dropped.
20
I cluster standard errors at the GP practice level to account for arbitrary correlation in errors
over time.
For both outcome measures results are reasonably stable across specifications. Although there
is a clear change in the coefficient on the difference-in-difference interaction for prescribing
costs when the practice and patient controls are introduced it is not statistically significant.
Interpreting on the basis of columns (4) and (8), these results are consistent with practices with
governing body GPs reducing costs but lowering quality during the transitional phase of the
reform relative to other practices. The effects are small - prescribing costs per patient are 0.5%
lower while the avoidable hospitalisation rate increases by around 1.3%. The coefficients on
control variables are mostly consistent with intuition. An increasing share of elderly patients
is associated with both increased spending on drugs and a greater proportion of avoidable
hospitalisations. The disease prevalence measures are generally intuitive, but throw up some
unexpected results such as the sign on the share of cancer patient coefficients in the prescribing
regressions. It could well be that correlations between conditions could account for these effects.
Finally, the positive association between the GP patient ratio and the avoidable hospitalisation
rate is unexpected, and could perhaps reflect issues with continuity of care.
4.2 Restricted Control Group
I now turn to regressions using the control group composed of practices in the Select Control
group which have pre treatment characteristics and trends in outcomes (with the exception of
the referral rate) that are statistically indistinguishable from the treated group. I report three
sets of results: Tables 5 and 6 report results for different outcome variables relating to cost and
quality respectively while in Table 7 I report further result on quality from specifications that
use patient experience ratings from the GP patient survey as outcomes measures.
The columns in Tables 5 and 6 correspond to the first three specifications in Table 4; the final
specification is dropped because there are fewer observations with the control group employed
here. As before, standard errors are clustered at the practice level. The panels in each Table
each correspond to a different outcome measure. I suppress the coefficients on controls for space
reasons, highlighting the set of controls at the bottom of the Tables.
Looking along the rows findings seem to be reasonable consistent across specifications when
using the restricted control group. The results in Table 5 illustrate that the coefficients on the
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Table 4: Unrestricted Difference-in-Difference Approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log prescribing costs per patient Log avoidable admission (PAH) rate
Gov.Body × post -0.0084∗∗∗ -0.0081∗∗∗ -0.0059∗∗∗ -0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0125∗ 0.0147∗∗ 0.0133∗ 0.0135∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0061)
GPs/1000 patients 0.0114 0.0084 0.0200∗ 0.0222∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0135) (0.0105) (0.0097)
% Aged 65+ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0030)
% CHD 0.0124∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0122 0.0173
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0116) (0.0106)
% Stroke or TIA 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0019 -0.0009
(0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0168) (0.0147)
% Hypertension 0.0034∗∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0037 0.0020
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0031)
% Diabetes 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0096 0.0038
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0076) (0.0070)
% COPD 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0227∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0103) (0.0090)
% Epilepsy 0.0376∗∗ 0.0367∗∗ 0.0233 0.0271
(0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0332) (0.0290)
% Hypothyroidism 0.0034 0.0009 -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0070
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0099) (0.0096)
% Cancer -0.0212∗∗∗ -0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.0179∗
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0114) (0.0098)
% Mental Health 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗ 0.0473∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0117) (0.0211) (0.0153)
% Heart Failure -0.0073 -0.0138∗∗ -0.0392∗∗ -0.0261∗
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0171) (0.0153)
% Palliative 0.0013 -0.0034 0.0181 -0.0061
(0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0162) (0.0126)
% Dementia 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0177) (0.0148)
% Kidney Disease -0.0032∗∗ -0.0032∗∗ -0.0052∗ -0.0005
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0026)
% Atrial Fibr. -0.0135∗∗ -0.0122∗ 0.0470∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0169) (0.0148)
% Obesity 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0014)
% Learning Diff. 0.0053 0.0060 0.0070 0.0011
(0.0088) (0.0085) (0.0231) (0.0217)
Practice FX X X X X X X X X
Year FX X X
Region-Year FX X X X X X X
PCT-Year FX X X
CCG-Year FX X X
Observations 88032 88032 88032 88032 88032 88032 88032 88032
R-squared 0.942 0.943 0.948 0.952 0.728 0.733 0.735 0.770
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the practice level. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1
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difference-in-difference estimate for prescribing costs is larger than previously, roughly double
in magnitude. The previous evidence shows that pre reform trends in the referral rate were
non-parallel. For completeness, I report this in panel B but in any case the coefficient can
not be distinguished from zero (despite being consistently negative). In the panel beneath
the dependent variable is the proportion of referrals that ended in a discharge at the first
appointment, which is used as a measure of inappropriate referral activity by some CCGs (note
that the dependent variable is scaled to be in the range 0 to 100). The coefficient of interest
stable and weakly significant in the three specifications and suggests governing body practices
reduced the proportion of referrals that ended at the first outpatient appointment by 1%.
The results in Table 6 implies that the effect of governing body membership on the avoidable
hospitalisaiton rate is again larger than previously, also by a factor of around 2. The results in
panel D are weakly significant. In panel E I tweak the set up so that the sample only includes
2009/10 and 2012/13 (and hence the treatment period is solely quarters in 2012/13). Here the
coefficients become larger and more precisely estimated which is consistent with the effect being
greater in this latter financial year of the reforms.
The final two panels in this Table are included as placebo checks. In the first I take the rate at
which patients are admitted to hospitals in emergencies with conditions that are not deemed
to be avoidable with primary care. The coefficients are close to zero and not significant. In
the final panel I use the average inpatient waiting (the time between the decision to admit and
the admission). I use this rather than the outpatient waiting time (the time between the GP
referral and a patients seeing a consultant for an outpatient appointment) as it seems unlikely
this could influenced by GPs. Again, the coefficients are small and not significant.
My final set of results in Table 7 looks more at a different aspect of quality by focusing on
patient experience, using an identical practice level set-up (with the restricted control group) as
previously but now using data for the second quarter of 2010, 2012, and 2013 — corresponding to
the June 2010, 2012 and 2013 NHS Patient Surveys. I extracted data for responses to 8 questions
that are consistent between these surveys regarding overall satisfaction (would you recommend
the practice?), waiting times (are you satisfied with opening hours?), confidence in the GP, and
ratings of the GP on 5 different dimensions. Since the weighting system changed during this
time, I use the unweighted responses to questions and include socio-economic and demographic
controls and the survey response rate on the right hand as controls (share unemployed, share
aged 65+, share ethnicity white, share male).
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In the first column, I use the PAH rate as the outcome in this set up which includes a smaller
number of quarters and a greater range of controls as a further check on the robustness of the
result. The results demonstrate that the effect remains of the same magnitude and is still weakly
significant. The coefficients on the interactions of interest are not significant for the majority
of outcomes, indicating that becoming part of a CCG governing body has had no effect on
patients’ overall satisfaction, confidence in their GP, or satisfaction with opening. However, the
findings in this table do suggest that GPs at treated practices were perceived to be significantly
less good at listening to their patients and explaining tests and treatments to them. While I
have no evidence of pre treatment trends for these outcomes, they are consistent with falling
quality in treated practices in the transition.
Table 5: Restricted Control Group, Cost Measures
(1) (2) (3)
A: Prescribing Costs per patient
Gov.Body× post -0.0148∗∗ -0.0136∗∗ -0.0123∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0057)
Observations 15744 15744 15744
R-squared 0.963 0.965 0.969
B: Referral rate
Gov.Body× post -0.0246 -0.0387 -0.0379
(0.0376) (0.0356) (0.0346)
Observations 15744 15744 15744
R-squared 0.860 0.870 0.871
C: % Referred but discharged at first appt.
Gov.Body × post -0.9797∗ -0.9888∗ -0.9892∗
(0.5797) (0.5664) (0.5697)
Observations 15744 15744 15744
R-squared 0.743 0.761 0.764
Practice FX X X X
Year FX X
Region-Year FX X X
Patient and Practice controls X
Notes: Se’s clustered at practice *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 6: Restricted Control Group, Quality Measures
(1) (2) (3)
D: Avoidable hosptialisation rate
Gov.Body × post 0.0346∗ 0.0258 0.0303∗
(0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0175)
Observations 15744 15744 15744
R-squared 0.900 0.903 0.903
E: Avoidable hosptialisation rate, 2012/13 only
Gov.Body × post 0.0405∗∗ 0.0314∗ 0.0391∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0188) (0.0190)
Observations 10496 10496 10496
R-squared 0.900 0.903 0.904
F: Other non-elective admission rate
Gov.Body × post 0.0079 -0.0027 0.0022
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127)
Observations 15744 15744 15744
R-squared 0.819 0.827 0.829
G: Average waiting time
Gov.Body × post 0.0002 0.0044 0.0042
(0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0102)
Observations 15744 15744 15744
R-squared 0.574 0.601 0.603
Practice FX X X X
Year FX X
Region-Year FX X X
Patient and Practice controls X
Notes: Se’s clustered at practice *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 7: Restricted Control Group: Additional Quality Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Patient Survey
GP rated Good or Better %
PAH rate R’mend Satisfied Confident GP time GP listen GP explain GP involve GP manner
practice % open hrs % in GP %
Gov.Body× post 0.0284∗ -0.0032 -0.0019 0.0007 -0.0022 -0.0066∗ -0.0077∗ -0.0064 -0.0060
(0.0167) (0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0039)
GPs/1000 patients 0.0249 0.0106 0.0034 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0129 0.0222∗∗ 0.0221∗∗ 0.0204 0.0175
(0.0398) (0.0141) (0.0109) (0.0061) (0.0098) (0.0086) (0.0108) (0.0124) (0.0109)
% Unemployed -0.2988 -0.0708 -0.0504 0.0105 0.0447 0.1015∗∗ 0.0997∗∗ 0.0994∗ 0.0931∗
(0.1969) (0.0634) (0.0494) (0.0318) (0.0444) (0.0418) (0.0496) (0.0583) (0.0512)
% Aged 65 + 0.0483 0.0332 0.0590∗∗∗ -0.0004 0.0093 0.0142 0.0235 0.0387∗ 0.0217
(0.0607) (0.0213) (0.0192) (0.0106) (0.0152) (0.0143) (0.0176) (0.0207) (0.0176)
% Ethn. White 0.1601 0.0796 -0.0178 -0.0125 0.0372 -0.0026 0.0098 -0.0207 0.0246
(0.1763) (0.0530) (0.0427) (0.0250) (0.0339) (0.0324) (0.0371) (0.0473) (0.0403)
% Male 0.1541 -0.0483 -0.0034 0.0302 -0.0429 -0.0197 -0.0035 -0.0293 -0.0182
(0.1601) (0.0448) (0.0391) (0.0205) (0.0313) (0.0296) (0.0364) (0.0406) (0.0338)
Survey response rate (%) -0.1049 -0.0137 0.0073 -0.0303 -0.0292 -0.0140 0.0165 0.0116 0.0072
(0.1245) (0.0385) (0.0336) (0.0198) (0.0294) (0.0274) (0.0329) (0.0378) (0.0316)
Disease prevalence controls X X X X X X X X X
Practice FX X X X X X X X X X
Region-Year FX X X X X X X X X X
PCT-Year FX X X X X X X X X X
Observations 3266 3266 3266 3266 3266 3266 3266 3266 3266
R-squared 0.940 0.897 0.834 0.805 0.843 0.855 0.870 0.852 0.864
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the practice level. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Disease prevalence controls are prevalence of the 16 health conditions
used in earlier regressions. Unweighted GP patient survey results are for June 2010 (control) & June 2012 and June 2013 (treatment). Recommending GP surgery to
someone who has just moved to the local area - Yes, would definitely recommend or would probably recommend. Satisfaction with opening hours - Very satisfied or
fairly satisfied. Confidence and trust in GP - Yes, definitely, or yes, to some extent. GP ratings are % rating good or very good for: GP giving you enough time; GP
listening to you; GP explaining tests and treatments; GP involving you in decisions about your care; GP treating you with care and concern.
4.3 Quantitative Interpretation
In this section I quantify the financial costs or savings associated with the findings for prescrib-
ing and avoidable hospitalisations. It is important to reiterate that these are not intended to
describe the overall effects of the reforms since they describe outcomes of governing body prac-
tices relative to other practices during the transition. Further, I make no attempt to quantify
a range of other costs and benefits, e.g. any saving or costs from changed referral behaviour,
patient satisfaction, or indeed any wider costs associated with hospital admission (for example
on the health and productivity of individuals, or on crowding at hospitals).
Based on the dataset described above there are 1,150 governing body practices, on average with
9400 patients which means roughly 10.8 million patients are registered at a practice represented
on a CCG Board during the transition. The mean quarterly cost of prescriptions per patient
is roughly £38 per patient. Using the coefficient in Table 5 of -0.0123 implies that a saving of
47p (= £38 * 0.0123) per patient per quarter was saved in 2011/12 and 2012/13 relative to
other practices, implying an overall saving on drugs of £40.6 million. Alternatively, using the
coefficients in Table 4 would imply a saving of around half this amount, so that I estimate the
savings in prescribing costs from practices are between £20 and 40 million over the two years.
The mean number of avoidable hospitalisation per 1000 patients per quarter is 5.9, so with 9400
patients each governing body practices has on average 55.5 avoidable admissions each quarter.
Using the coefficient in Table 6 of 0.0303 implies an additional 1.7 in each practice each quarter,
implying an additional 15,640 avoidable admissions across the 8 quarters. Tian et al. (2012)
estimate the average cost of an avoidable admission to be £1,750 so this equates to a cost of
roughly £27.4 million. The same calculation using the coefficient in Table 4 of 0.0135 implies
additional financial costs of £12.1 million over the same period.
5 Discussion
The findings above suggest that — at least in the short-term — the effect of giving GPs budgets
led GPs to engage in cost saving behaviour but also led to reductions in the quality of care. In
this section, I discuss possible mechanisms may account for these effects in the context of the
literature, although as with related literature (e.g. Gaynor et al. (2004)) I am unable to directly
relate changes in outcomes to particular channels so this is essentially speculative.
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A broad literature, including research on GP fundholding cited earlier, suggests that physician
gatekeepers do respond to financial incentives. In the Appendix I sketch a simple model of GP
behaviour under group based financial incentives that suggests if governing body GPs are able
to appropriate resources from budget savings, they may be incentivised to engage in cost saving
activity while other GPs do not. Of course appropriation relies on some mechanism for GPs
on governing bodies to benefit from making budgetary savings. CCGs have awarded more than
400 contracts worth upwards of £2.4bn to organisations in which GP board members have a
financial interest (Iacobucci 2015), which could be one such channel.
A second possibility is that participation on a governing body makes allocative efficiency issues
more salient to GPs. Recognising the role of medical ethics in determining professional norms
in healthcare, models of GP behaviour often incorporate altruistic regard for patient’s health
or welfare into GP utility (Arrow 1963; McGuire 2000; Rebitzer and Taylor 2010; Clemens
and Gottlieb 2014). Some researchers also posit that doctors’ choices may reflect regard to the
allocation of scarce resources between competing needs (Ellis and McGuire 1986; Blomqvist
1991; Chandra and Skinner 2012). In a controlled experiment analysing tradeoffs in physician
decisions, Kesternich et al. (2015) find that efficiency concerns influence choices even when
medical ethics are made salient to medical decision-makers. These authors argue that in reality
costs to society are often not salient to physicians when deciding how to treat a patient. It
seems plausible that direct budgetary oversight does just this.
Finally, the results on quality outcomes may reflect that the reforms distracted from patient
care, a view expressed by the King’s fund (Ham et al. 2015). Developing CCGs and taking
on new commissioning duties during the transitional phase of the reform required time and
effort on the part of the GPs involved. Practices were reimbursed for the time spent by GPs
on commissioning duties, but it is uncertain how they adapted to provide patient care e.g. by
sharing workload between remaining doctors, taking on new permanent staff, or by employing
locums.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I provide quantitative analysis of health care reforms that took place in England
in the period 2010 to 2013. The central feature of the reform was to pass responsibility for
commissioning services and associated budgets to groups of GPs. I aim to to generate insights
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about the effects of this change on practice level outcomes, distinguishing between outcomes
that indicate a focus on saving costs, and those that indicate a focus on care quality.
The empirical work applies difference-in-difference techniques to practices with plausibly similar
pre-treatment trends. Two caveats are that the findings are generated from the transitional
phase of the reforms so by definition impacts estimated are short term and may or may not be
a guide to the longer term impacts of the reforms. No attempt is made to capture potential
costs or benefits that may arise slowly e.g. through service redesign. Secondly, estimates
are generated by comparing GP practices most closely associated with the reforms with other
practices. However, all GP practices in my sample became commissioners so this relative effect
may not be representative of the overall short term effect.
Notwithstanding these caveats, findings suggest that practices most actively engaged with new
responsibilities changed behaviour relative to other GPs in ways consistent with taking cost
saving steps: prescribing a lower average value of drugs to each patient, and by reducing the
proportion of referrals that were discharged at the first outpatient attendance. On the other
hand, findings are also consistent with these same practices reducing the relative quality of care:
having a greater proportion of patients avoidably admitted to hospital in an emergency, and
falling patient satisfaction. The results on quality are only weakly significant, but consistent
across a variety of specifications and are supported by placebo tests on related outcomes. I
explore a number of explanations for these results, including that the reforms incentivised
doctors to reduce quality in order to save cash or that they simply distracted those doctors
most closely involved.
29
References
Ansari, Z. et al. (2012). “Patient characteristics associated with hospitalisations for ambulatory
care sensitive conditions in Victoria, Australia”. BMC health services research 12 (1): p. 475.
Arrow, K. J. (1963). “Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care”. The American
economic review, pp. 941–973.
Basu, J. and B. Friedman (2001). “Preventable illness and out-of-area travel of children in New
York counties”. Health economics 10 (1): pp. 67–78.
Baum-Snow, N. and F. Ferreira (2014). Causal inference in urban and regional economics. Tech.
rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Blomqvist, A˚. (1991). “The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance,
and medical care”. Journal of Health Economics 10 (4): pp. 411–432.
Busby, J. et al. (2015). “A systematic review of the magnitude and cause of geographic varia-
tion in unplanned hospital admission rates and length of stay for ambulatory care sensitive
conditions”. BMC health services research 15 (1): p. 1.
Chandra, A. and J. Skinner (2012). “Technology Growth and Expenditure Growth in Health
Care”. Journal of Economic Literature, pp. 645–680.
Cheng, S.-H. et al. (2010). “A longitudinal examination of continuity of care and avoidable
hospitalization: evidence from a universal coverage health care system”. Archives of Internal
Medicine 170 (18): pp. 1671–1677.
Clemens, J. and J. D. Gottlieb (2014). “Do Physicians’ Financial Incentives Affect Medical
Treatment and Patient Health?” The American economic review 104 (4): p. 1320.
Conservative Party (2007). NHS Autonomy and Accountability, Proposals for legislation. Policy
document.
Croxson, B. et al. (2001). “Do doctors respond to financial incentives? UK family doctors and
the GP fundholder scheme”. Journal of Public Economics 79 (2): pp. 375–398.
Department of Health (2010a). Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS. White Paper, July
2010.
30
Department of Health (2010b). Liberating the NHS: legislative framework and next steps. Im-
plementation Plan, December 2010.
– (2010c). “The Operating Framework for the NHS in England 2011-12, December 2010”.
– (2011a). Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS - Managing the Transition. Letter from
David Nicholson, 13 April 2011, Gateway Ref: 15966.
– (2011b). Resource Allocation: Weighted Capitation Formula.
– (2011c). “The Operating Framework for the NHS in England 2012-13, November 2011”.
Dusheiko, M. et al. (2004). “The effect of practice budgets on patient waiting times: allowing
for selection bias”. Health Economics 13 (10): pp. 941–958.
Dusheiko, M. et al. (2006). “The effect of financial incentives on gatekeeping doctors: evidence
from a natural experiment”. Journal of health economics 25 (3): pp. 449–478.
Dusheiko, M. et al. (2007). “The impact of budgets for gatekeeping physicians on patient sat-
isfaction: evidence from fundholding”. Journal of health economics 26 (4): pp. 742–762.
Ellis, R. P. and T. G. McGuire (1986). “Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement:
Cost sharing and supply”. Journal of health economics 5 (2): pp. 129–151.
Gaynor, M. (1994). “Issues in the industrial organization of the market for physician services”.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 3 (1): pp. 211–255.
Gaynor, M. et al. (2004). “Physician incentives in health maintenance organizations”. Journal
of Political Economy 112 (4): pp. 915–931.
Goodwin, G. (1998). “GP Fundholding”. In: Learning from the NHS Internal Market: A Review
of the Evidence. Ed. by Le Grand, J., Mays, N., Mulligan, J. Kings Fund Publishing, pp. 43–
68.
Ham, C. et al. (2015). The NHS under the coalition government.
Ham, C. J. (2010). “GP budget holding: lessons from across the pond and from the NHS”.
Harrison, M. J. et al. (2014). “Effect of a national primary care pay for performance scheme on
emergency hospital admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions: controlled longitudi-
nal study”. BMJ 349, g6423.
31
Iacobucci, G (2012). GPs outnumbered on nearly half of CCG boards. Pulse, 17 July.
Iacobucci, G. (2015). “General practice commissioning: in whose interests?” BMJ 351. doi:
10.1136/bmj.h6000.
Imison, C and C Naylor (2010). “Referral management: lessons for success. London: Kings Fund,
2010”.
Kesternich, I. et al. (2015). “Professional norms and physician behavior: Homo oeconomicus
or homo hippocraticus?” Journal of Public Economics 131, pp. 1 –11. issn: 0047-2727. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.009.
KPMG/IpsosMori (2011). KPMG/IpsosMori Survey of GPs. 4 July, 2011.
Liu, T. and C.-t. A. Ma (2013). “Health insurance, treatment plan, and delegation to altruistic
physician”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 85, pp. 79–96.
McGuire, T. G. (2000). “Physician agency”. Handbook of health economics 1, pp. 461–536.
National Audit Office (2007). Presribing Costs in Primary Care.
NHS Commissioning Board (2012a). Clinical commissioning group governing body members:
Role outlines, attributes and skills. Guidance July 2012.
– (2012b). Towards establishment: Creating responsive and accountable clinical commissioning
groups. Policy guidance February 2012.
NHS England (2012). The Month. Special Issue 52, March 2012.
Nyweide, D. J. et al. (2013). “Continuity of care and the risk of preventable hospitalization in
older adults”. JAMA internal medicine 173 (20): pp. 1879–1885.
OECD (2012). Health at a glance: Europe 2012.
Propper, C. et al. (2002). “Waiting times for hospital admissions: the impact of GP fundhold-
ing”. Journal of health economics 21 (2): pp. 227–252.
Purdy, S et al. (2009). “Ambulatory care sensitive conditions: terminology and disease coding
need to be more specific to aid policy makers and clinicians”. Public health 123 (2): pp. 169–
173.
32
Rebitzer, J. B. and L. J. Taylor (2010). Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard
and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets. Handbook of Labor Economics. O.
Ashenfelter and D. Card.
Rosano, A. et al. (2013). “The relationship between avoidable hospitalization and accessibility
to primary care: a systematic review”. European Journal of Public Health 23 (3): pp. 356–360.
Smith, J. et al. (2010). Giving GPs Budget’s for Commissioning: What Needs to be Done?
Nuffield Trust for Research and Policy Studies in Health Services.
Starfield, B. et al. (2005). “Contribution of primary care to health systems and health”. Milbank
quarterly 83 (3): pp. 457–502.
Thygesen, L. C. et al. (2015). “Potentially avoidable hospitalizations in five European countries
in 2009 and time trends from 2002 to 2009 based on administrative data”. The European
Journal of Public Health 25 (suppl 1): pp. 35–43.
Tian, Y et al. (2012). “Emergency hospital admissions for ambulatory care-sensitive conditions:
identifying the potential for reductions”. Kings Fund.
Timmins, N. (2012). “Never again”. The story of the Health and Social care Act.
Weissman, J. S. et al. (1992). “Rates of avoidable hospitalization by insurance status in Mas-
sachusetts and Maryland”. Jama 268 (17): pp. 2388–2394.
33
A Appendix
A.1 Construction of Governing Body treatment measures
The treatment measure is a time invariant GP practice level categorical variable, GBp which
takes value 1 if the CCG has a GP on the governing body during the transition or 0 otherwise. I
additionally construct a control group of practices that host a GP governing body member, but
only outside the treatment window. Generating these variables at the practice level is challeng-
ing because of data constraints and is further complicated by a number of factors including GPs
joining and leaving Board positions, and moving between practices. Constructing the indica-
tors involved several steps: compiling a dataset linking individual GPs to CCG Board positions;
linking GP employment histories since 1 April 2009 to the dataset; and finally, excluding a small
number of practices from the sample, for the reasons set out below. There is no central and
comprehensive database of CCG Board members so at all stages information is verified across
different sources where possible, although in and some places a degree of judgment was required.
For the first step, I requested the names, practices details, and Board membership details of
all current and past GP members of CCG Boards via Freedom of Information (FOI) requests.
Around half of the 211 CCGs returned useful information. The resulting GP practitioner dataset
was reviewed against Governing Body details in CCG annual reports (largely for 2013/14),
harvesting new data to fill gaps and correct transcription errors where necessary. A significant
limitation is that the information provided (FOI requests) or reported (annual reports) usually
dates only from the establishment of CCGs as a legal entities (April 2013). The upshot is
that commencement dates for Board positions are commonly recorded as 1 Apr2013. In the
empirical work that follows, my “treatment” on period is the start of 2011/12 and I proceed
as if governing body members had taken up their positions by that point. The assumption
is based on information described in the paper e.g. the fifth wave of pathfinder GP consortia
was formed in July 2011, covering some 97% of the population; news reports about individual
CCG governing bodies and GP participation etc. The result of this first stage is a database
of 1,629 GPs with indicators for GPs who held positions on the governing body throughout
the transition (Current board) or held positions on CCG governing bodies but outside the
treatment window of 1 April 2011 to 1 April 2013 (Future board).
To construct GP practice level treatment measures from this GP practitioner level data, I next
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create job histories back to q1 2009/10 for individual GPs by matching the GP name to data
held by the Organisation Data Service of the NHS Information Centre (file: egpcur21), using
secondary sources where necessary to facilitate a match. I match GPs to practices and assign
the individual GP indicator variable Current board or Future board to the practice.
Note that I allow indicator variable to be assigned to multiple practices for the small number
of GPs in the database registered to work at two practices (13 GPs) during the timeframe of
investigation, and that there are around 50 practices which are associated with more than one
GP in the database.
In a final step I exclude around 100 GP practices from the analysis: practices where the GP
governing body member practices in a different CCG to where they act as a Board member;
practices where a governing body GP left the practice before the end of Q4 2012/13; and
practices where a GP played a role in the initial phases of the reform but did not ultimately
become part of the governing body in place on 1 April 2013. This latter group is identifiable
from information sources including (i) CCG annual reports and other Board documents (ii)
responses to earlier FOI requests for details of clinical leads at CCGs during the transition (iii)
letters from CCG leaders to national newspapers (iv) data released by NHS England.
A.2 ICD-10 codes used to calculate Avoidable Hospitalisation
The Table below reproduces the ICD-10 codes in Purdy et al. (2009) Table3 (wider set of
diagnosis codes) but excluding dental problems. These are the ICD–10 codes used in this paper
to define potentially avoidable hospitalisations.
21See <www.systems.hscic.gov.uk/data/ods/datadownloads/gppractice>
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Table A1: ICD-10 codes used to define potentially avoidable hospitaisations
Condition ICD–10 codes
Angina I20, I24.0 I24.8 I24.9 I25 R072 R073 R074 Z034 Z035
Asthma J45 J46
Cellulitis L03 L04 L08.0 L08.8 L08.9 L88 L98.0 I891 L010 L011
L020 to L024 L028 L029
Congestive heart failure I11.0 I50 J81 I130 I255
Convulsions and epilepsy G40 G41 R56 O15 G253 R568
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease J20 J41 J42 J43 J47 J44 J40X
Dehydration and gastroenteritis E86 K52.2 K52.8 K52.9 A020 A04 A059 A072 A080 A081
A083 A084 A085 A09 K520 K521
Diabetes complications E10.0–E10.8 E11.0–E11.8 E12.0–E12.8 E13.0–E13.8
E14.0–E14.8 E139 E149
Ear, nose and throat infections H66 H67 J02 J03 J06 J31.2 J040
Gangrene R02
Hypertension I10 I11.9
Influenza and pneumonia J10 J11 J13 J14 J15.3 J15.4 J15.7 J15.9 J16.8 J18.1 J18
J189 J120 J121 J122 J128 J129 J160 A481 A70x
Iron–deficiency anaemia D50.1 D50.8 D50.9 D460 D461 D463 D464 D510–D513
D518 D520 D521 D528 D529 D531 D571 D580 D581
D590–D592 D599 D601 D608 D609 D610 D611 D640 to
D644 D648
Nutritional deficiency E40 E41 E42 E43 E55.0 E64.3
Other vaccine–preventable diseases A35 A36 A37 A80 B05 B06 B16.1 B16.9 B18.0 B18.1 B26
G00.0 M01.4
Pelvic inflammatory disease N70 N73 N74
Perforated/bleeding ulcer K25.0–K25.2 K25.4–K25.6 K26.0–K26.2 K26.4–K26.6
K27.0–K27.2 K27.4–K27.6 K280–282 K284–K286 K920
K921 K922 K20x K210 K219 K221 K226
Pyelonephritis N10 N11 N12 N13.6 N300 N390 N159c N308 N309
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A.3 A simple model of GP behaviour under CCG group incentives
To consider the effects of the reforms introducing financial incentives, I sketch a simple nu-
merical two period model in which group incentives are activated only in the second period.
Following Rebitzer and Taylor (2010) I assume GPs follow professional norms such that they
incur disutility when service level m (in £) is below some “ideal” level of care mB which to-
gether with wages determines GP j’s utility. In the first period, GPs have the common following
utility:
uj = wj︸︷︷︸
wages
+ f(mj −mjB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
professional norms
Following the reforms (period 2), CCGs become responsible for design of local services & staying
within budget. I assume that membership of a CCGs now provides an additional source of utility
to all n member practices via a group financial incentive where savings in practice patient care
budgets Bj are shared equally between practices:
22
uj = wj︸︷︷︸
wages
+ f(mj −mjB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
professional norms
+
1
n
 n∑
j=1
(Bj −mj)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
group incentive
I consider a simple numerical example with 2 GPs and that choose a level of care mj ∈ (0, 1)
where 0 indicates patients receive a low level of care (e.g referrals and prescriptions) and 1 a high
level. Further I assume that the budget Bj = mB = 1; & that f(mj −mB) = −0.5(mj −mB)2.
It is trivial to show that prior to the reforms, both GPs play high to avoid the penalty from
providing a low level of care. The payoff matrix below shows the utility in period 2. Here, there
is no dominant strategy; each GP has no unilateral incentive to start playing low abut if the
GPs can coordinate to both play low, utility is maximised.
22This is not permissible under the reforms. However, it might also be the case if, for example, savings on
commissioning budgets were reinvested in primary care services and all GPs in the CCG collectively own these.
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GP 1
m1 = 0 m1 = 1
2
m2 =
0
w + 0.5
w + 0.5
w + 0.5
w
G
P m2 =
1
w
w + 0.5
w
w
This simple model illustrates the potential conflict of interest if GPs can appropriate savings
from reduced patient care, but is not able to explain the divergence between CCG governing
body practices and other practices observed in the data. I now consider a second scenario
in which I make the strong assumption that GP 1 sits on a CCG governing body and can
appropriate the savings from patient care budgets for his own benefit, such that it wholly
benefits GP 1. Now, following the reforms, GP 2 has a dominant strategy of playing high &
GP 1 has a dominant strategy of playing low.
GP 1
m1 = 0 m1 = 1
2
m2 =
0
w + 1.5
w − 0.5
w + 1
w − 0.5
G
P m2 =
1
w + 0.5
w
w
w
These models are not intended to be realistic and make very strong assumptions about how
savings in commissioning budgets can be appropriated, but are useful in illustrating why gov-
erning body GPs may have stronger incentives to make cost saving measures than other GPs
and hence to explain the observed patterns in the data.
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